Wednesday, August 9, 2017

Generosity When Paying For Others


It is no surprise that people tend to be frugal when making purchases for themselves.  They look for good deals and generally want to minimize the cost of the things that they buy. 
But what about when buying things for other people?
This question was explored in a fascinating paper in the September, 2014 issue of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology by Minah Jung, Leif Nelson, Ayelet Gneezy and Uri Gneezy. 
First, in a series of field studies, they compared two conditions:  Pay What You Want and Pay It Forward.  In Pay What You Want, people get to decide how much they want to pay for something.  In Pay It Forward, people are told that someone else has paid for them, and they have the opportunity to pay what they want for the next person. 
Three studies looked at entry into a museum.  That museum (the Cartoon Art Museum in San Francisco) has a Pay What You Want day each week.  People attending the museum were randomly assigned to be told that they could pay what they wanted or that a previous person had paid for them and they had the option to pay what they wanted for another visitor.  In each of these studies, participants paid about 30% more when paying for someone else than when paying for themselves.  A fourth field study involved people buying coffee at a farmer’s market.  Participants paid about 20% more when making a purchase for someone else than when making a purchase for themselves.
Why does this happen?
The researchers performed a series of laboratory experiments to explore this possibility.  One study allowed some participants to meet the next participant before the study.  During the study, participants were given $10 for participating and then were given a coffee mug.  Some participants were told to pay what they wanted for the mug.  Others were told that their mug had been paid for and they could pay what they wanted for the next participant.  As in the field studies, participants paid more when they were paying for someone else (about $2.00) than when paying for themselves (about $1.50).  Meeting the other participant, though, had no impact on how much they were willing to pay.
In this study, participants were also asked how much they thought other people paid for the mug. Interestingly, participants estimated that other people paid more for the mug than they were willing to pay for it themselves. 
This finding suggests that people are overestimating how much other people pay for things, and that is influencing what they spend when paying for someone else.  To test this possibility, another study gave people information about how much other people paid for the mug.  Some people were told the previous participant paid 50 cents.  Others were told that the previous participant paid $2.50.  A control condition was given no information.
In this study, participants in the control condition showed the same effect as before.  They paid more when paying for someone else than when paying for themselves.  When given information about what other people paid, though, the difference in conditions disappeared.  People who were told that the previous participant paid a small amount were willing to pay less than those who were told that the previous participant paid a lot.  But, there was no longer a difference between paying for yourself and paying for someone else.
This work suggests that people adopt different ways of thinking about prices when paying for themselves and when paying for others.  When paying for themselves, people want to get a good deal. That means that they want to pay something, but generally less than what they think other people are paying.  When buying for someone else, though, people give more weight to their beliefs about what other people pay for things.  In order to be seen as generous, people want to feel like they are adhering to a norm. 
An interesting aspect of this work is that people do pay something when given the option to pay whatever they want.  People have the option in all of these studies (including the field studies) to take something for free.  And they do not do that.  There is an inherent sense of fairness that leads people to want to pay something for goods that they take, even though they want to feel like they get a good value for their money.
One reason why people want to pay something for what they get is that there is a broad social contract involved in transactions.  People assume that if they start taking things for free that eventually everyone will try to get something for nothing.  And that means that their own efforts will not be valued in the future.

Thursday, July 13, 2017

Using Cognitive Science to Teach About Sex


Sex is a wonderful thing that has potentially life-altering consequences—particularly for teens.  Teen pregnancy can derail educational opportunities.  Sexually transmitted diseases from unprotected sex can have lifelong consequences. 
Because sex is so consequential, sex education is a routine part of teen education, though regions vary in the content of that education.  Some areas of the United States focus primarily on “abstinence only” education that asks teens to refrain from having sex at all.  Other regions have a broader base for their sex education that suggests that teens wait to have sex until they are older, but also provides information about contraception and ways to prevent sexually transmitted infections. 
The best possible outcome for sex education programs is for teens to have an appreciation for the desirability of sex and for them to be able to engage in healthy sexual behavior.  The longer that teens wait to initiate having sex and the more that they practice safe sex (like using condoms) the less likely that they will suffer from the potential negative consequences of having sex.
The most effective programs take a broad-based approach to sex education.  They provide facts about sexual function and healthy sexual practices.  They provide information about risks.  They also give teens practice having difficult conversations about saying no and using condoms.  In addition, they give homework to teens to speak to pharmacists about condoms in order to reduce their anxiety about buying them at the store.
A fascinating paper by Valerie Reyna and Britain Mills in the August, 2014 issue of the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General explored whether a sex education curriculum could be improved by using an understanding of differences between the way teens and adults learn about risks. 
Valerie Reyna and her colleagues have developed a comprehensive model of learning they call fuzzy trace theory.  One of the components of this model is that people store information in a number of different ways.  They learn about the surface of what they were told as well as the gist, which is a summary of the broad meaning of what they were told.
An interesting component of this theory is that adults tend to focus on the gist of what they learn, but that teens often focus on the surface details. 
In the case of sex education, this can be a problem, because many of the facts that teens learn about the consequences of unprotected sex are taught as probabilities.  For example, teens may be taught that the chances of getting pregnant after having unprotected sex are about 1 in 12.  That means that heterosexuals who repeatedly have unprotected sex are highly likely to create a pregnancy. 
Adults readily store this gist information, but teens tend to get focused on the details and remember the probability.  Consequently, they judge unprotected sex as less risky than they should.
In order to overcome this bias in teens, Reyna and Mills took an established sex education curriculum (called Reducing the Risk) and modified it to include more focus on gist level information and less focus on details that teens might remember in ways that would reduce their assessment of the severity of the risks of unsafe sex. 
In a randomized experiment, over 700 teens from three states were assigned either to the original Reducing the Risk curriculum, the modified curriculum that included more gist information, or a control condition that focused on communication skills. The classes in each condition involved a total of 16 hours of instructions with some homework.
The teens were given assessments of their sexual behavior and their attitudes and beliefs about sex before the classes and several times afterward with a final assessment a year after taking the class to which they were assigned.
A year after taking the class, teens who took either curriculum felt they were better equipped to say no if they did not want to have sex, were better prepared to use protection during sex, and had a better understanding of the risks unprotected sex than those in the control condition.
In addition, a year after the class, fewer people who took one of the two classes were deciding to become sexually active than those in the control condition.  Those students who took the course that focused on gist level information were least likely of all the groups to become sexually active.   For those students who were sexually active, those who took the course that focused on gist had fewer partners than those who took the standard curriculum or those in the control condition.  
In addition, the students who took the class that focused on gist also had a better understanding of social norms about safe sex than those who took the standard curriculum or those in the control condition.
That said, once students became sexually active, they engaged in about the same number of acts of unprotected sex and expressed about the same degree of intention to engage in safe sex regardless of whether they took one of the sex education classes or not.
Overall, these results suggest that a broad-based sex education curriculum does help reduce the amount of risky sexual behavior that teens engage in.  In particular, it can increase knowledge, decrease the likelihood of becoming sexually active, and potentially reduce the number of sexual partners that teens engage with.  Using an understanding of the way teens learn can improve the effectiveness of sex education, and it can help teens to develop more accurate knowledge about the risks associated with unprotected sex.
This is just another way that research in cognitive science can be used to improve the way people learn.

Friday, July 7, 2017

Saving Face by Using Ambiguous Language


When we use language, it seems so easy to understand what other people are saying that it is hard to appreciate the complexity of the act of carrying on a conversation.  Obviously, we miscommunicate at times, but most of the time, we do a good job of understanding what other people mean and making ourselves understood.
It is particularly striking that we are so good at communicating when we realize how often we do not say directly what we mean to other people. 
Even in everyday situations, we often speak indirectly.  For example, you might ask a colleague “Can you open the door?”  You are not literally asking this colleague whether she is capable of opening the door.  You are asking for her help. 
In addition to this indirect speech, we use a lot of terms whose meanings are ambiguous.  For example, in the previous sentence, I used the phrase “a lot.”  What does that mean.  It means more than a few and not as many as a ton but it does not refer to a specific number.
We use these ambiguous terms for many reasons.  One reason is that specific values may not be available (or all that relevant).  I don’t know exactly how many ambiguous terms there are in English, but a lot seems like a reasonable description of them, and so I use that term. 
An interesting paper by Thomas Holtgraves in the August, 2014 issue of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology examines the role people’s beliefs about saving face on the way we understand ambiguous words.
Whenever we communicate with someone else, we are presenting something about ourselves to others.  The public view of our selves is called our face.  We want to manage the impression we give to others and to present as positive a face as possible.  In addition, most of the time we don’t want to put our conversation partners in a situation in which they will lose face in our interaction.
For example, suppose a friend cooks you a meal.  At the end of the meal, you can say, “I liked it.”  The word “like” is ambiguous, and so you can use it for a range of attitudes toward the meal, but it allows your conversation partner to maintain a positive impression while you are talking.
If people are sensitive to this use of language, then they should assume that when people use ambiguous evaluations like this when talking with friends, their actual impression of the object is less good than when there is no reason to be worried the face of their conversation partner.
To test this possibility, the researcher had people read fictitious conversations between people.  Sometimes, the speaker was evaluating an item (like a home-cooked meal) that was made by the hearer.  They used ambiguous words such as “liked,” “loved,” “good,” and “excellent.”  Other times, the speaker was evaluating an item that was made by a third person, so that the face of the hearer was not involved.  For example, Sue might ask Jenny whether she liked the meal that Harry cooked, and Jenny might reply, “I liked it.”  Then, participants rated how much they thought the speaker actually liked the item.
Consistent with the idea that people are concerned about preserving face in conversations, participants rated that the speaker liked the object (such as the meal) less when they used an ambiguous word and were talking to the person who created the item than when they were talking to a person who did not make the item.  That is, people assume that the speaker is trying to help the hearer save face by not telling the hearer exactly what they thought of their product.
In other studies, Holtgraves demonstrated a similar effect with words that refer to frequencies and quantities like often or sometimes.  In this case, the speaker was telling the hearer that the hearer had a negative quality.  For example, Sue might tell Jenny “You sometimes have bad breath.”  Or, Sue and Jenny might be talking about Harry and Sue might say “he sometimes has bad breath.” 
In this case, participants thought the speaker meant that the ambiguous word to refer to a higher frequency when it was used to save face than when it wasn’t.  That is, telling Jenny she sometimes has bad breath means that she has it more often than telling Jenny that Harry sometimes has bad breath.
These studies demonstrate that a lot of the complexity of using language properly is not a result of the language itself, but rather a result of the way we use language to manage our social interactions.  Because we are sensitive to people’s need to preserve a positive public face, we use the ambiguity of language to help them do that.
Ambiguous words are helpful, because they do not require us to come out and criticize other people forcefully when we want to give them bad news.  Instead, we can soften the blow and make the conversation go more smoothly by giving the hearer some wiggle room in how they interpret what is said.

Wednesday, June 28, 2017

Creating Shared Memories


When we think about memory, we often focus on situations in which we encounter some information and then recall it later.  In many situations, though, after we encounter the information, we talk about it with other people.  That creates a shared recollection.  This can happen both socially and in education situations.
Much less is known about shared recollection than about individual recall.  Cognitive psychologists tend to focus mostly on what individual people do rather than groups of people, and so most memory studies involve individuals who study information and then remember it later.
A fascinating paper by Adam Congleton and Suparna Rajaram in the August, 2014 issue of the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General looked at factors relating to shared memory. 
One observation from previous research on creating shared memories is that when groups work together to recall information, they remember less information overall than the individuals in the group would have remembered if they had worked alone.  The idea is that the group discussion focuses the group members on a subset of the information they were exposed to, and that subset is smaller than what the individual group members would have thought about if they had not been part of a group.
In this study, participants in a room were exposed to 120 words on a projection screen.  The words were chosen from 8 categories of objects, so that there would be some way for remembering one word to remind people of other words on the list.  After a brief delay, all participants were asked to remember as many of the words as they could.  Then, participants performed three more recall tests in that session and one additional test a week later. 
Some participants worked alone in all of the remaining recall tests.  The rest of the participants were put in groups of three.  In one condition, the group did the second recall task together.  In a second condition, the group did the third recall test together.  In a fourth condition, the group did both the second and third recall tests together.  The last recall test of the first day and the test a week later were all done individually.  There were some subtle differences across these three group conditions, but I will gloss over those for now.
When the group did recall, they talked about the words they remembered, and one member of the group wrote down each word that the group remembered. 
What happened?
Looking at the last recall session on the first day, groups of three individuals selected at random from the individual condition remembered more overall than the groups that recalled a list together.  That is consistent with the previous findings that I mentioned.
Recalling in a group increased the similarity of what people from that group were able to remember.  People in groups that worked together recalled more of the same items than people who recalled alone.  In addition, they tended to remember the words in the same order.  These findings suggest that working together as a group made everyone’s memory of the words more similar.
A particularly interesting result was that the groups that showed the most similarity at the end of the study (as measured both by the amount of overlap in what they remembered and the similarity of the order or recall) was related to the difficulty that groups have recalling information overall compared to individuals.  Groups that remembered less when they worked together were more similar later than groups that remembered more when they worked together. 
The idea is that when a group really works together, they influence each other’s memory.  The idiosyncrasies of what they would remember drop away, and they end up with a shared memory of the set of words.  So, everyone loses some details about the list, but they end up with a strong shared memory.
A similar pattern of results was observed after a one-week delay suggesting that working with the group influenced the long-term memory of the list.
The researchers in this study used lists of words, because that is a convenient way of comparing memories across people.  But, this work tells us something about memories in general.  When we discuss an event with the people around us, it affects what all of us are able to remember later.  Over time, the group’s memory for an event gets more similar, so that eventually all of the group members remember the same details about the event.  Even though they may have experienced the event differently, recalling it with others makes everyone’s memory more similar.

Wednesday, May 31, 2017

Personal Goals and Relationship Goals Trade Off


A quick walk through the checkout line at most grocery stores takes you past an array of magazines that the store hopes you will grab on your way out.  The headlines from those magazines scream out solutions to the problems people struggle with.  And to judge from their content, three of the biggest problems center around weight loss, sex, and relationships.
Why are relationships such a source of anxiety? 
A paper by Laura VanderDrift and Christopher Agnew in the June, 2014 issue of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology suggests that personal goals that people have trade off against relationship goals in ways that can hurt relationships.
The broad idea is one that is related to research that I did several years ago with Miguel Brendl and Claude Messner.  We found that when people were strongly motivated to pursue a goal, it made people appreciate (or value) goal related objects more and to devalue goal unrelated objects.
Similarly, these researchers suggest that when people are highly motivated to pursue a personal goal, they devalue their relationship.
In their studies, people were either asked to consider a personal goal relevant to them (Should I learn to play the saxophone or not?) or to actually think about the steps required to carry out that goal (What are five steps I would need to take to learn to play the saxophone?).  Previous research by Peter Gollwitzer and his colleagues suggests that thinking about the steps required to carry out a goal increases the strength of that goal more than just thinking about the goal in general.
Across five studies in this paper, participants were much less willing to engage in behaviors that would have a positive impact on their relationship if they had an active personal goal than if they did not. 
In one study, participants who were in a relationship were less willing to forgive their partner for a transgression when they had an active personal goal than when they did not.  This was particularly true for transgressions that would get in the way of their personal goal. 
In another study, participants were given the opportunity to get information improving their relationship or improving their ability to achieve personal goals.  People who had an active personal goal were much less interested in getting information about how to improve their relationship than those who did not have an active personal goal.  However, the more strongly that people felt that their romantic partner helps them to achieve personal goals, the more interested they were in information that would help them improve their relationship.  So, even their interest in relationship information was related to whether that would help them achieve their personal goal.
A final study reversed this effect.  In this study, some participants were induced to have a strong relationship goal by having them list steps they would take to improve their relationship.  This group was much less interested in getting information to improve personal goals than a group that did not have an active relationship goal. 
This set of findings reflects an important aspect of our motivational system.  We are very efficient at achieving the goals that the motivational system engages.  As a result, we focus on information that is useful for achieving our goals and we devalue information that is not related to achieving that goal. So, when we have an important personal goal, our relationships take a back seat.  When we have an important relationship goals, our personal goals take a back seat.
So, if you find yourself wandering through the supermarket checkout aisle, and you resonate to the headlines about relationship problems, it might be time to think about specific steps you could take to improve your relationship as a way of engaging that goal.

Monday, April 10, 2017

Seeing unexpected things makes some people more creative


Most days don’t require a lot of creativity.  You get up and go through your normal routine.  Your school or work day involves a lot of repetition of tasks like those you have done before.  The day may be interesting, but it didn’t require you to really stretch out beyond your comfort zone.
Sometimes, though, you really need a novel solution to a difficult problem.  At those times, it would be great to have a way to jump-start the creative process.
Descriptions of the creative process often focus on two phases of creativity.  In the divergent phase, many different potential ideas need to be generated. In the convergent phase, those ideas need to be evaluated to select the ones that are most promising.  The divergent phase is particularly difficult, because it requires going beyond existing ideas in some way.
Research by Malgorzata Goclowska, Matthijs Baas, Richard Crisp, and Carsten De Dreu described in the August, 2014 issue of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin suggests that thinking about inconsistent concepts jump-starts divergent thinking for some people. 
These researchers focus on an individual difference called Need for Structure.  The idea is that some people really like their world to be predictable and to follow rules.  Other people are less bothered when things do not go according to plan.  They suggest that divergent thinking by people who are low in Need for Structure (so that they are not bothered by surprises) is helped by thinking about surprising juxtapositions of concepts.  People high in Need for Structure are hurt by thinking about these surprising items.
In one study, participants were asked to study a series of pictures for a later memory test.  One group saw pictures of people in situations consistent with their costume.  They might see an astronaut in space or an Eskimo on the snow.  A second group saw pictures of people in situations that were inconsistent with their costume (an astronaut in the snow or an Eskimo in space). 
Then, the participants were asked to generate as many names as they could think of for a new type of pasta.  The instructions gave five examples of pasta names that all ended in an ‘i.’  The researchers were interested in whether participants would generate pasta names that ended in different letters and how often they would switch the last letter, which would suggest that they were trying different methods for generating names. 
The inconsistent pictures had an interesting influence on participants.  Participants who were low in need for structure tended to generate many more pasta names that did not end in ‘i’ and to generate names ending in many different letters compared to those people who were high in need for structure.  Seeing consistent pictures did not have much influence on participants’ performance regardless of their need for structure.
A second study demonstrated a similar finding using the Remote Associates Test, in which participants are shown three words (MAGIC PLUSH FLOOR) and are asked to find another word that could go with each of them (in this case, CARPET).  In this case, participants generated the attributes of either a schema-consistent person (a male mechanic) or a schema-inconsistent person (a female mechanic).  Participants who thought about the schema-inconsistent person generated more correct answers on the Remote Associates Test if they were low in Need for Structure than if they were High in Need for Structure.
These results suggest that if you are trying to jump-start your creativity, you need to know a bit more about yourself.  If you are willing to accept uncertain situations, then exposing yourself to inconsistent juxtapositions of concepts may get you thinking divergently.  If you are less willing to accept uncertainty, though, then this strategy won’t work for you.

Thursday, March 23, 2017

Some Conformity Effects Are Short-Lived


There is often strong social pressure for people’s judgments and beliefs to conform to those of people around them.  It can be hard to be the only person in a group to express a divergent opinion.  At times, people will actually express an opinion closer to that of others while with a group in order to fit in.
What is the long-term impact of this conformity?
It is difficult to study this question, because it is hard to set up situations in which people disagree.  In addition, it is hard to get enough observations for each person to be able to make a strong statistical claim about the effect of conformity.
An paper by Hi Huang, Keith Kendrick, and Rongjun Yu in the July, 2014 issue of Psychological Science explored this question using judgments of facial attractiveness.  Although the study is not entirely satisfying, it has some intriguing effects. 
In this study, participants rated the attractiveness of 280 faces on a scale from 1 (not very attractive) to 8 (very attractive).   After making their rating, participants saw a rating that they were told reflected the average rating from 200 other people who had seen the same picture.  The rating they saw was either the same as the one they gave, or was between 1 and 3 points higher or lower.
Across studies, participants then returned to the lab 1, 3, or 7 days later, or 3 months later.  Then, they rated the attractiveness of the same set of faces. 
It is actually difficult to examine the second set of ratings statistically.  The group rating can only be substantially higher than the participant’s rating for faces that the participant rated as relatively unattractive.  The group rating can only be substantially lower than the participant’s rating for those that the participant rated as relatively attractive.  So, changes in the rating from one session to the next might just reflect a tendency to move more extreme ratings toward the middle of the scale.
The researchers used a statistical technique to control for this tendency for high ratings to get lower and for low ratings to get higher.  With this statistical control, they found that faces that they rated as attractive in the first session were seen as less attractive in a subsequent session when the group rating was lower than the participant’s rating.  However, this effect occurred only when the section session was 1 or 3 days after the first session.  By 7 days later (and also 3-months later), there was no significant effect of the group rating on the participant’s later rating.
This result suggests that when people hear an opinion that deviates from their own, there is a small tendency to revise their opinion in the direction of the group.  However, these effects are small and short-lived.  After about 3 days, the group influence seems to be gone.
On the one hand, this is an intriguing finding.  It suggests that just being exposed to the opinions of other people once does not necessarily have a long-term influence on a person’s beliefs.
That said, there is a lot more work that needs to be done on this issue.  People see many faces each day, and so it is not clear why group judgments about attractiveness ought to have a long-term impact on people’s beliefs.  In contrast, political beliefs or social beliefs might be more susceptible to the impact of other people.  In addition, people made a total of 280 judgments in each session of the study.  It is hard to believe that participants could really remember the judgments of others.  Indeed, it is surprising that there was any effect of the group judgment at all in this study. 
In the end, this study provides an interesting demonstration of how hard it can be to test what seems like a straightforward question.